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THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR A 
DESIGN DEFECT STANDARD 
STEVEN G. DAVISON* 
INTRODUCTION 
In design defect litigation, the injured plaintiff seeks to establish that 
the design and specifications for a product are inadequate because the 
manufacturer failed to use some alternative safer design.l Although 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.S., 1968, Cornell 
University; J.D., 1971, Yale University. 
1. Three principal categories of product defects can be identified: (1) manufacturing defects, 
(2) design defects, and (3) inadequate warnings or instructions concerning the hazards presented by 
the product. Se~ W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 99 (4th ed. 1971). While only 
design defects will be discussed in this article, these defects perhaps can best be described in relation 
to each other. A manufacturing defect, for example, involves a situation in which the product that 
caused an injury was not produced in accordance with the manufacturer's design and specifica· 
tions. Se~ Wade, On th~ Nalur~ofSlnct Tort Liability, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 831 (1973). Such defects may 
be the result of flawed components or raw materials used in manufacturing the product. Se~, ~.g., 
Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d 527 (rex. Civ. App. 1975) (metal in surgical needles weakened 
by "crimping" and drilling process, though manufacturer took steps to prevent the flaw). 
In a design defect case, the product is manufactured in accordance with the manufacturer's 
design and specifications, but the design specifications are inadequate because the manufacturer 
did not use a safer alternative design. Se~, ~.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 348 
N.E.2d 571, 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976) (printing press manufacturer failed to use guards 
that would have protected operator from han~ injury). In both design and manufacturing defect 
cases, the injured plaintiff attempts to recover damages by establishing that the product was not 
made in accordance with a benchmark design or specification. In a manufacturing defect case, the 
manufacturer's failure to produce the product in accordance with his own design and specifications 
is unintentional and accidental. In a design defect case, on the other hand, the product design is 
the result of an intentional decisionmaking process that is "defective," "wrongful," or "inade-
quate." Se~ Henderson,Judlclol RtvI~w of Manufadurers' Conscious .Design ChOICes: Th~ Limits of A4/udlca-
lion, 73 CoLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973). 
The third category of product defects, lack of adequate warnings or instructions, involves a fail-
ure to provide, with a product, both warnings of the dangers that consumers may encounter if they 
do not use the product for its proper purpose and instructions that inform the user how to avoid 
these dangers. Se~ McClanahan v. California Spray Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953) 
(orchard spray manufacturer liable for failure to warn of danger to orchards if spray improperly 
used). 
A sub-category of principal defects is "crashworthiness" or "second collision" defects. These de-
fects do not cause the initial accident, but rather enhance the person's injuries when he collides with 
the interior or exterior of the product. Se~, ~.g., Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 
201,207,321 A.2d 737, 740 (1979). "Crashworthiness" defects can be design defects, as in Turner 
v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (rex. 1979), or manufacturing defects, as in Lahocki v. 
Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 398 A.2d 490 (1979), raJ'd on other §7'Owuls sub nom. 
General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714,410 A.2d 1039 (1980). 
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courts2 and commentators3 have devoted much attention to developing 
an appropriate standard to apply in evaluating a product's design, the 
courts have not adopted a universal test for analyzing a product's inade-
quacy or defectiveness.4 The lack of a clear standard may not provide 
manufacturers with sufficient guidance in developing a product's design 
and, consequently, may deny consumers a safer and less costly product. 
The present design defect standards do not require the judge or the 
jury, before holding a manufacturer liable, to find that an alternative, 
technologically feasible design is possible that would have prevented 
plaintiff's injuries. The standards, moreover, do not require the trier of 
fact to find that adoption of an alternative design would have been a 
better allocation of the manufacturer's and society's resources. As a re-
sult, there are no objective criteria for judges to apply in deciding 
whether to submit a design defect case to the jury. Furthermore, if the 
case is submitted to the jury, the jury may impose liability on a manu-
facturer on the basis of whim or caprice. 
This article will examine critically the six major tests for deciding 
whether a product's design is inadequate or defective by discussing each 
test and its inherent weaknesses in actual application. The article then 
proposes a new test that should remedy the shortcomings of the other 
design defect tests. The proposed standard does not impose liability on 
a manufacturer unless the plaintiff establishes that there is a safer, tech-
nologically feasible alternative design that results in a more efficient al-
location of resources under a marginal cost-benefit analysis, or that the 
product's design is so dangerous that it should not be marketed even 
though no safer design exists. The article concludes that such a stan-
dard would give manufacturers fair notice about the requirements for 
the product's design and promote an optimum allocation of resources. 
2. For a compilation of products liability cases concerning design defects, see Annot., 96 
A.L.R.3d 22 (1979). 
3. Se~ gmerally A. WEINSTEIN, A. TwERSKI, H. PIEHLER & W. DaNAHER, PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT (1978); Fischer, Products Liabilz(y-Th~ M~aning of 
.Deftct, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339 (1974); Henderson, .D~ign .Deftct Litigation &lJisit~d, 61 CORNELL L. 
REv. 541 (1976) [hereinafter cited as .Deftct LI~igationj; Henderson, Rm~w~dJudicial ContTOoersy Ooer 
.Deftctiue Product .D~ign: Toward th~ Pr~ervation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Rm~w~d ControlJersy j; Henderson, note 1 supra; Hoenig, ProtilKt .D~igns and Strict 
Tort Liability: Is There a Beller Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 109 (1976); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liabilzty: 
TIr~ M~aning of ".Deftct" in th~ Manufacture and .D~sign of ProdlKts, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969); 
Keeton, ProdlKt Liability and th~ M~aning of .Deftct, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Keeton, Prodt«ts 
Liabilz(y-.D~lgn Hazards and t!t~ M~aning of .Deftct, 10 CUM. L. REV. 293 (1979); Phillips, Th~ Standord 
.for .Determining .DeftctilJm~ss in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 101 (1977); Twerski, Weinstein, 
Donaher & Piehler, Th~ Us~ and Abus~ of Warnings in Products Liabilz(y-.D~lgn .Deftct Litigation Com~s of 
Ag~, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976); Wade,supra note 1; Walkowiak, ProdlKt Liability Litigation and 
th~ Conc~Pt of .DeftctilJ~ Goods: "&asonablm~s" &lJisl~~d?, 44 J. AIR LAw & COM. 705 (1979). 
4. But see Rm~w~d ControlJersy, supra note 3, at 773-76 (emerging consensus that the cost-benefit 
analysis is the proper analysis). 
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I. THE PURPOSES THAT A DESIGN DEFECT TEST SHOULD SERVE 
A design defect standard has three basic purposes. It is used to allevi-
ate a plaintiff's difficulty in proving fault or lack of reasonable care by a 
manufacturer in designing a product,5 to allocate risks and spread losses 
from injuries resulting from the use of defective products,6 and to pro-
vide an incentive to manufacturers to produce a safe product.7 In order 
to fulfill this third objective, a design defect standard must provide a 
manufacturer with precise guidelines concerning minimum product 
safety. Guidelines will enable the manufacturer to predict whether he 
will be held liable for damages if the product's design causes injury to 
persons or property. 
If a design defect standard does not enable the manufacturer to make 
a reasonable determination regarding the minimum safety requirement 
expected for the product, and the manufacturer's design falls below such 
minimum requirements and results in injury to persons or property, the 
public is harmed in at least two ways. First, consumers may incur inju-
ries that might have been avoided if a safer design had been adopted or, 
if no safer design were available or feasible, the product had not been 
marketed. Second, if the manufacturer cannot determine minimum 
product safety requirements, an inefficient allocation of resources may 
result, with the consumer bearing the burden.8 
Similarly, if the lack of precision in a design defect standard causes a 
manufacturer to err on the side of caution and produce a product that is 
much safer than the law requires, society may again suffer. Additional 
safety measures, not required by law, can raise the product's price by an 
exorbitant amount or significantly decrease the product's utility.9 
Moreover, the capital needed to design and produce these additional 
safety features may have to be diverted from uses that society might find 
more desirable. In recognition of these concerns, courts do not require a 
5. &t' Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (fray-
nor, J.. concurring) (absolute liability advocated as logical extension of concept of implied warranty 
of safety). 
6. One court has stated this purpose to be "the primary policy rationale convincing courts to 
adopt strict products liability." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 877 (Alaska 1979). 
7. Id. 
8. Such misallocation occurs when the costs of the liability for damages to injured consum-
ers-damages that would have been avoided if a safer design had been used-exceed both the 
manufacturer's transaction costs of making a safer design and the abatement costs of producing a 
safer product. &t', t.g., Posner, Sirici Liability: A Commmi. 2 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1973) (suggests 
retaining contributory negligence defense as incentive for party with most efficient solution to take 
precautions in order to reduce avoidable costs to society); Sachs, /Wgligt'1lCt' or Sinet Product Liability: Is 
77zm- Rtally a IJi.fft'Tt'1lCt ill Law or Economics?, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 259 (1978) (focusing on the 
economic costs and benefits of strict products liability). 
9. &t', t'.g., MicaIlefv. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387, 348 N.E.2d 571, 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d 
115, 122 (1976) (product can become unworkable when an alleged missing feature is added or can 
become so expensive as to be priced out of the market). 
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manufacturer to design an "accident-proof' or "injury-proof' product 
or to act as an insurer. to 
A design defect standard should be as precise as possible because soci-
ety is ill-served if a manufacturer designs a product that is considerably 
more safe or less safe than the law requires. At the same time, the stan-
dard should continue to serve the goals of protecting consumers from 
injury and compensating those who are injured while using a product. 
II. THE MAJOR DESIGN DEFECT TESTS 
The courts generally apply one or more of the following six tests to 
determine whether a product is defective in its design:ll (1) the devia-
tion-from-the-norm test;12 (2) the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 
402A test;13 (3) the ordinary consumer expectations test;14 (4) the risk-
utility test; 15 (5) the California hybrid test; 16 and (6) Professor Hender-
son's design testY A critical examination of the six major design defect 
standards illustrates several weaknesses in each. These inadequacies 
lead to numerous problems for courts, juries, and manufacturers in ap-
plying these standards, thereby indicating a need for a new, more effec-
10. Su, ~.g., Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 216-17, 321 A.2d 737, 745 
(1974). Automobile manufacturers, however, are under a duty to use such care as would "avoid 
subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in the event ofa collision." Id. at 217, 321 A.2d 
at 746 (quoting Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968». 
11. The first five tests are recognized as the major tests used by the courts to determine prod-
uct defectivene:;s. Se~ Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 880 (Alaska 1979). Professor 
James Henderson proposed a sixth test in Henderson, supra note 1. 
12. Under this test, a product is defective if it does not compare in quality to most similar 
products. Thus, the manufacturer is liable for injuries resulting from the product's "deviation from 
the norm." Se~ Traynor, Th~ Wty's and M~ans of .D~ctive Products and Strict Lia6ilz9', 32 TENN. L. REV. 
363,367 (1965). Se~ also notes 18-27 & accompanying text infta. 
13. The seller is liable for injury caused by a product if it is in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user, to the consumer, or to his property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. Se~ notes 28-32 & accompanying text 
zi!fia. 
14. A product is defective if: (1) it leaves the seller's hands in an unreasonably dangerous 
condition not contemplated by the consumer, and (2) it is more dangerous than the ordinary con-
sumer with ordinary knowledge of the product's characteristics would expect. Grenno v. Clark 
Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965). This test is also generally known as the user-
oriented or seller-oriented test. Se~ notes 33-56 & accompanying text infta. 
15. Under this test, the court weighs diverse factors relating to the product's utility or desira-
bility and its risk or dangerousness. Se~ Keeton, Product Li'a6i1z9' and th~ M~aning of IHftct, supra note 3, 
at 37-38; Wade, supra note 1. at 837-38. Se~ also notes 49-87 & accompanying text infta. 
16. The California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 
143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), adopted a design defect test that combines the consumer expectation test 
with a risk-utility analysis. Se~ notes 88-107 & accompanying text zi!fia. 
17. Henderson proposes that courts should not find a manufacturer's inadvertent design error 
defective if the design is consistent with professional engineering standards. Moreover, the manu-
facturer's conscious design choice is not grounds for liability if such design complies with govern-
mental safety standards or, in the absence of such standards, the product is accompanied by 
adequate warnings and instructions. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1548-50. Se~ notes 108-29 & ac-
companying text infta. 
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tive design defect test. IS 
A. The Deoiation-j7om-the-Norm Test 
Under the deviation-from-the-norm test, a product is found defective 
if it is not of the same quality as other similar products. 19 Although this 
test has been found reliable in defining manufacturing defects,2° it is 
18. An area of disagreement in design defect cases revolves around the issue of whether a test 
for determining the adequacy of a design should vary depending on whether the cause of action is 
for negligence or strict liability. Su Renewed ControveT{)" supra note 3, at 777. Some courts believe 
that the standard for determining the adequacy of a product's design is the negligence standard of 
reasonable care. These courts require the application of the negligence standard even though the 
cause of action asserted by the plaintiff is strict liability in tort or breach of the implied warranty of 
merchantability under § 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., Volkswagen of America, 
Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 220-21, 321 A.2d 737, 747-48 (1974); Balido v. Improved Mach. Inc., 
29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1973). 
A second approach requires that different design defect standards apply in "strict liability" ac-
tions and in negligence actions. See Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 397, 564 
P.2d 674, 675-76 (1977). This case distinguishes negligence and strict liability actions: In negligence 
cases, foreseeability of harm is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, whereas in strict 
liability cases, the product's harmful propensities are assumed regardless of whether the manufac-
turer or seller foresaw or should have foreseen the danger. Id.; see also Ulrich v. Kasceo Abrasives 
Co., 532 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Ky. 1976); Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 397, 
564 P.2d 674, 675-76 (1977); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 486, 494-96, 525 P.2d 1033, 
1037-38 (1974). Courts following the first approach reject this second approach on the grounds that 
"a manufacturer who designed the product obviously would have knowledge of the defect, since the 
design of the product is an intentional act on the manufacturer's part." Frericks v. General Motors 
Corp., 274 Md. 288, 305, 336 A.2d 118, 128 (1975). At least one jurisdiction has posited another 
distinction between the design defect standard applicable in negligence actions as opposed to strict 
liability actions. Schulides v. Service Mach. Co., 448 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (E.D. Wis. 1978). In a 
negligence action, there may be recovery for personal injuries caused by a product's design when it 
was designed without ordinary care even though its design was not established to be unreasonably 
dangerous, as is required in most jurisdictions in a strict liability action under § 402A of the Re-
statement of Torts. See, e.g., Suter v. San Antonio Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.]. 150,406 A.2d 140 
(1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). This 
doctrine has been criticized, however, on the grounds that a "designer cannot have been negligent 
in his design choices unless the resulting design poses an unreasonable risk of harm." Renewed Con-
trrwtl'{)', supra note 3, at 803. 
Another issue considered in design defect litigation revolves around the rule that some courts 
apply to deny recovery to a plaintiff who was injured by design defects whose dangers are patent or 
obvious. See Williams v. Brasea, Inc., 497 F.2d 67, reheanizg dmied, 513 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1974), eert. 
dented, 423 U.S. 906 (1975); Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones. 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979); Mical-
lefv. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571. 384 N.Y.S.2d ll5 (1976). The majority of courts, 
however, find that a manufacturer can still be liable for injuries caused by a design defect whose 
dangers are obvious or patent if there is a feasible, inexpensive, alternate design available that 
would reduce or eliminate the risk of injury . .see, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384-
85,348 N.E.2d 571, 576-77, 384 N.Y.S.2d lIS, 120-21 (1976); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 
Wash. App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d 713, 718-19 (1970). See general{)1 Darling, The Patent .Danger Rule: An 
Ana{)1sis and a Sul'V9 oj'its Vila/r'fy, 29 MERCER L. REV. 583 (1978); Marschall, An Obvious Wrong.Does 
Not Mole a Right: Manufacturers' Liabilt'fy for Patent{)1 Dongerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1065 
(1973). 
19. For example, a soda bottle is defective if it is chipped around its mouth. 
20. Set', t.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84,75 Cal. Rptr. 652 
(1969) (automobile found to have defectively connected drive shaft); Vandermark v. Ford Motor 
Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (automobile defectively manufactured 
where brakes activated unexpectedly); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (lathe built without proper fastening device found defective 
when similar lathes incorporated device). 
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unsuitable in design defect cases for several reasons. First, while compar-
ing one manufacturer's line of products with those of other manufactur-
ers may be helpful in determining whether the design is inferior to its 
counterparts, courts have not viewed consistency with industrywide 
practices as the determinative factor in strict liability or negligence 
cases.21 The deviation-from-the-norm test thus can never be definitive 
in ascertaining a design defect. 22 
Second, this test may be over-inclusive in defining design defects and 
may deprive society of many worthwhile and necessary products.23 The 
polio vaccine, for example, is an unavoidably dangerous product be-
cause it contains an inherent risk that the user will react adversely to the 
product and contract polio.24 Under the deviation-from-the-norm test, 
these types of unavoidably dangerous products would be found defec-
tive, and consequently manufacturers would no longer market them.25 
Finally, this test places the burden of proving the product's deviation 
on the plaintiff.26 In design defect litigation, this is a particularly heavy 
burden because the plaintiff must offer technical evidence on how a 
manufacturer's engineering standards deviate in quality from the design 
standards of other manufacturers. The deviation-from-the-norm test is 
therefore unsuitable for application in design defect cases because it 
defeats one of the major goals of products liability theory-relieving the 
plaintiff of the burden of proof.27 
B. The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 102A Test 
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability 
on a seller for any injury caused by a product if the product is, at the 
time it left the seller's hands, in a defective condition that is unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user, to the consumer, or to his property.28 Courts 
have interpreted section 402A in several ways. Although most courts 
21. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 881 (Alaska 1979). 
22. ld. 
23. Su'Traynor, supra note 12, at 367. 
24. In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968), the court stated that 
the manufacturer of Sabin oral polio vaccine could not be held liable solely because plaintiff had 
contracted polio after receiving the vaccine. The court stated in dicta that a manufacturer cannot 
guarantee to every user that the drug is safe for his individual use. Such a requirement would deter 
manufacturers from marketing drugs that are normally the most effective in combatting disease. 
ld. at 128. 
25. Me gmnally Keeton, Products Liability-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REV. 131, 134 
(1972). 
26, Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882 (Alaska 1979). 
27. ld. For a more extensive discussion of the inadequacies of the deviation-from-the-norm 
test, see Traynor, supra note 12, at 367-73. 
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 402A. The seller must also be engaged in the business of 
selling that product and the product must be expected to, and does, reach the consumer without 
substantial change in its condition. If the plaintiff meets the standards of this test, he has no burden 
of proving specific acts of negligence by the manufacturer, who is then deemed negligent per se. Mt' 
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apply section 402A in conjunction with the American Law Institute's 
comments g and i, termed the ordinary consumer expectations test,29 or 
with a risk-utility balancing test,30 some courts have adopted it as a de-
sign defect standard exclusive of the comments.31 
A design defect standard such as section 402A, exclusive of comments 
g and i, that simply states that a product's design is defective if the prod-
uct's condition is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, pro-
vides only minimal, if any, guidance to a trial judge. No guidelines exist 
to help the judge decide whether a design defect case should go to the 
jury, and, if the case does reach the jury, the jurors are given little or no 
guidance in formulating a judgment. The jury thus would decide de-
sign defect cases on the basis of whim or caprice if this test were all that 
the judge charged in the jury instructions. This standard also is defi-
cient in providing guidelines for manufacturers regarding safety features 
that should be incorporated into the product's design.32 
C. The Ordinat), Consumer Expectations Test 
A number of courts that have adopted the section 402A test base the 
definition of a defective product on comments g33 and i.34 The use of 
Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 330, 230 N.W.2d 
794, 797 (1975). 
29. &,r, ,r.g., Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 
230 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action for strict liability against seller 
and manufacturer because product did not contain unreasonably dangerous defective condition as 
defined in comments g and i). The texts of comments g and i are set forth in notes 33 & 34 infta. 
30. &,r,.rog., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978) (jury should 
apply risk/utility analysis in determining liability that questions whether reasonably prudent man-
ufacturer would place product on the market after balancing hazards against utility). 
31. J},r Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459, 155 N.W.2d 55,63 (1967) (sufficiency of com-
plaint against manufacturer judged without reference to supplemental comments though court re-
fused to specifically accept or reject them). Section 402A is followed by 17 comments that are used 
by many courts when applying the section to a factual situation. 
32. The § 402A test without comments g and i also is unsuitable for use by courts that have 
deleted the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement from design defect cases based on strict liabil-
ity. A workable definition of "defective condition" is still needed. S.r,r Cronin v.J.B.E. Olson Corp., 
8 Cal. 3d 121,501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). In Cronin the court used comments g and i 
to define defectiveness, but rejected the term "unreasonably dangerous" as placing a burden that 
rings of negligence on a plaintiff in a strict liability case. Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. 
Rptr. at 442. 
33. Comment g defines "defective condition" in part as follows: "The rule stated in this Sec-
tion applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not 
contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 13, § 402A. 
34. Comment i defines "unreasonably dangerous" in part as follows: 
Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food 
or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-consumption. Ordinary 
sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an 
instrument of torture. That is not what is meant by 'unreasonably dangerous' in this 
Section. The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary customer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge 
common to the community as to its characteristics. 
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section 402A in conjunction with the two comments is generally called 
the ordinary consumer expectations test, under which there are two 
common approaches: user-oriented and seller-oriented. Under the user-
oriented approach, a product is defective if: (1) it leaves the seller's 
hands in an unreasonably dangerous condition not contemplated by the 
consumer, and (2) it is more dangerous than the ordinary consumer with 
ordinary knowledge of its characteristics would expect.35 This test gives 
legal effect to consumer expectations that result from the manufacturer 
or seller placing the product in the stream of commerce with the inten-
tion that it be purchased.36 By marketing the product, the seller repre-
sents that it is not unreasonably dangerous if put to its intended use.37 
Under the seller-oriented approach, a product is defective if it is so 
unreasonably dangerous that a reasonable seller would not have sold the 
product had he known of its harmful character.38 The Oregon 
Supreme Court argues that the user-oriented standards are essentially 
the same as those of the seller-oriented approach "because a seller acting 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 402A. 
35. Seo!", o!".g., Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Ginnis v. Mapes 
Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 
806 (1967); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 
N.W.2d 794 (1975). This test is also referred to as the user-oriented or seller-oriented test. Note also 
that there is some dispute over whether the Restatement's standards of "defective condition" and 
"unreasonably dangerous" establish one or two requirements. It has been suggested that § 402A 
enunciates two distinct requirements for recovery and that unless a product is both defective and 
unreasonably dangerous, liability will not be imposed. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 
133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972). Dean Wade argues, on the other hand, 
that the two terms comprise only one test. Wade, supra note 1, at 829. Seo!" also Caterpillar Tractor 
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882 n.36 (Alaska 1979). 
36. Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 263, 509 P.2d 529, 532 (1973). 
37. Id. The court assumes that a rationale similar to that which underlies an implied war-
ranty of merchantability is part of the theoretical basis for § 402A. The court thus analogizes the 
term "defective" under strict liability theory to "unmerchantable" under the theory of implied 
warranty for the sale of goods. 
38. Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973) Qack of harmful 
character oflawnmower design found not to be unreasonably dangerous for normal use); Phillips v. 
Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 491, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974) (reasonably prudent manufac-
turer having knowledge of the manner in which sanding machine was used would have provided 
safety feature or additional warning). 
At one time, the Texas Supreme Court required the jury to be instructed in a design defect case 
that a design is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous. Such condition exists "(1) if the product 
threatens harm to persons using the [product) to the extent that any [product) so designed would 
not be placed in the channels of commerce by a prudent manufacturer aware of the risk involved in 
its use or (2) to the extent that the [product) would not meet the reasonable expectations of the 
ordinary consumer as to its safety." Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex. 
1979) (citing Henderson v. Ford Motor Corp., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974); General Motors Corp. v. 
Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977». The Tum" case involved an alleged crashworthiness design 
defect in which the plaintiff sought to recover damages for paralysis that resulted from his vertebrae 
being crushed when his automobile rolled over, collapsing the car's roof. The Texas court in Tum" 
noted that the first prong of this instruction on unreasonably dangerous design that draws the jury's 
attention to "the additional perspective of the prudent manufacturer is to the advantage and for 
the benefit of an injured plaintiff and is available to him if under the facts the defect is apparent, or 
if it is felt that the fact finders might be diverted by the lack of expectations of the consumer with 
regard to the details of product design." Id. at 850. 
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reasonably would be selling the same product which a reasonable con-
sumer believes he is purchasing."39 
Some courts have added to the confusion surrounding defect tests by 
describing both the user-oriented and seller-oriented standards as the 
weighing of the product's utility against the risk of harm of its use, 
thereby suggesting that the consumer expectations test is synonymous 
with the risk-utility test.40 In actual application, however, user-oriented 
and seller-oriented tests cannot be viewed as identical to the risk-utility 
test because juries are not instructed to decide design defect cases based 
upon a risk-utility analysis. For example, although the Oregon Supreme 
Court requires the trial court to apply the risk-utility test in determining 
whether to send a design defect case to the jury, the jury itself is in-
structed to use the seller-oriented standard in its determination.41 
Under the user-oriented or the seller-oriented standard, a court will 
not allow a jury to speculate about the expectations of the ordinary con-
sumer.42 The jurors must base the determination upon the experiences 
of an average person, expert testimony, or other evidence that estab-
lishes what reasonable consumers expect from a product.43 The prob-
lem with this approach, however, is that jury instructions merely state 
that a product is defectively designed if: (1) the plaintiff demonstrates 
that it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect 
when it was used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner,44 or 
(2) it is so harmful to persons or property that a reasonably prudent 
39. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 493, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974). 
40. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 172-74, 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 
(1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1979). See olso Wade, supro note 
I, at 837-40. 
41. See, e.g., Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974). 
42. See Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967) (evidence not sufficient 
for jury to make informed decision on what ordinary consumer expects from product). 
43. The jury is charged with determining the factual question of what reasonable consumers 
expect from the product. Where the jury has no experience for knowing this, however, the record 
must supply such a basis. In the absence of either common experience or evidence, any verdict 
would, in effect, be the jury's opinion of how safe the product should be. Such an opinion by the 
jury would be formed without the benefit of data concerning the cost or feasibility of designing and 
building safer products. Without reference to relevant factual data, the jury has no special qualifi-
cations for deciding what is reasonable. Id. at 474, 435 P.2d at B09. In Turner v. General Motors 
Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979), the court held that in instructing the jury on the ordinary 
consumer expectation test, the jury need not be told that the expectations of the ordinary consumer 
must be reasonable;jurors know ''what ordinary consumers would expect in the consumption or use 
of a product" and jurors "would [not] or could [not] apply any standard or test outside that of their 
own experiences and expectations." Id. at 851. Earlier in the opinion, however, the court stated, 
inconsistently and without further explanation, that evidence about ordinary consumer expecta-
tions as well as risk and utility can be introduced in design defect litigation. Id. at 847. This latter 
statement was meant to refer possibly to cases involving the risk-utility balancing test, which the 
court adopted for future design defect cases. See text accompanying notes 79-BO il/ft0' 
44. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 
(1978). Although the court in Barhr created a two-pronged test, the second prong of which is the 
risk-utility test, the first part of the jury instructions adopted for this test is, in fact, the user-oriented 
test. 
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manufacturer or supplier with this knowledge would not have placed it 
on the market.45 Neither instruction gives the jury any criteria by which 
to decide whether the manufacturer's design is adequate, nor does it 
give the manufacturer any guidance regarding how safe he must make 
the product.46 
Before designing a product, a manufacturer could try to determine an 
ordinary consumer's expectations of its performance and safety by con-
ducting a public opinion survey. No court using either the user-oriented 
or the seller-oriented approach, however, has indicated that a product's 
design would be deemed adequate if its safety and performance features 
complied with consumer expectations as determined by surveys. Even if 
survey results were held determinative under the user-oriented standard, 
courts do not specify clearly what group of consumers should be used in 
determining ordinary consumer expectations. Courts give no indication 
whether ordinary consumer expectations are those of ordinary consum-
ers throughout the country, the state, or the neighborhood where the 
plaintiff purchased the product.47 
If courts accept surveys as evidence of ordinary consumer expectations 
in design defect cases under either the user-oriented or the seller-ori-
ented standard, certain problems remain. Public opinion surveys must 
poll a representative sample of relevant consumers. Furthermore, if ju-
rors are to determine average consumer expectations based upon either 
their own experiences or the testimony of an expert witness, courts must 
provide a frame of reference upon which to base such a determination.48 
Even if courts that apply the user-oriented standard provide manufac-
turers, expert witnesses, and juries with a frame of reference for con-
sumer expectations, manufacturers probably would face high costs in 
designing products to meet consumers' expectations in a particular lo-
cality. Manufacturers would be forced to determine ordinary consumer 
expectations in each jurisdiction, either through surveys or expert wit-
nesses, and would have to design and manufacture products to conform 
45. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492-93, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (1974). &e 
also Welch v. Outboard Motor Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973). 
46. Injurisdictions that follow the user-oriented test and allow recovery in a design defect case 
even if the defect is patent,sit note 18supra, the obviousness of the defect to the ordinary person is a 
relevant factor in determining ordinary consumer expectations with respect to the product's safety. 
&e Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (rex. Civ. App. 1972) (obvious lack of 
decal on glass door to warn of its existence not beyond contemplation of ordinary consumer); 
Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978) (obvious lack of kill switch on 
motorboat not beyond contemplation of consumer). 
47. The plaintifPs residence, the place of injury, or the location of design or manufacture of 
the product could also provide the frame of reference for determining ordinary consumer 
expectations. 
48. &e Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967) (where no direct or 
circumstantial evidence available, testimony of expert witness may be sufficient for jury to find 
product failed to meet reasonable consumer expectations). 
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to each jurisdiction's design standard. The more substantial the varia-
tion among the various standards, the greater the manufacturer's costs. 
User-oriented or seller-oriented tests that permit design defect standards 
to vary among jurisdictions might place such a substantial burden on 
interstate commerce that such standards might be found unconstitu-
tional under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.49 
The user-oriented test also poses problems in defining ordinary con-
sumer expectations where the person injured is a user of the product 
who was neither the purchaser nor a bystander injured by someone else's 
use of the product. This problem exists because the courts following the 
ordinary consumer expectation test do not indicate whether the ordi-
nary consumer in question is the person who purchased the product or 
selected its user or is the person injured by the product. Questions arise 
about whether the safety of a product purchased by an adult for use by 
a child should be measured from the standpoint of the child's expecta-
tions or the adult's expectations,50 or where a patient is injured by a 
drug a physician prescribes, whether the test should be defined in terms 
of the doctor's expectations or the patient's expectations.51 Similar 
questions arise in cases involving employees who are injured while using 
equipment or products selected or purchased by the employer or other 
cmployees52 or when one party involved in an accident is injured by a 
product belonging to another. 53 Problems also occur when the person 
injured by a product has lower expectations of product safety or per-
formance because of expertise or cynicism. 54 
The user-oriented standard also is inadequate to resolve several other 
types of cases. For example, the test is inapplicable in situations in 
which an ordinary consumer has no definite expectations about the 
product because he has no idea how safe it can be made. 55 He thus is 
49. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, c1. 3; $(( Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
In 8100, the Supreme Court held that even a state in the exercise of its police power may offend the 
commerce clause if, by a safety regulation, it places too heavy a burnen on interstate commerce, 
uncompensated by compelling advantages. Id. at 529. 
50. .Y( Bellote v. Zayre Corp., 116 N.H. 52, 352 A.2d 723 (1976) (court determines "unreason-
ably dangerous" from parent's viewpoint where parent buys pajamas for child, and child sets self on 
fire while playing with matches). 
51. .Y( V. Mueller & Co. v. Corley, 570 S.W.2d 140 (rex. Civ. App. 1978) (standard for 
"unreasonably dangerous" determined by expectations of ultimate consumer, the patient, even if 
prosthesis selected and implanted by physician). 
52. .Y( Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974) (where plaintiff 
injured by paint that ignited, standard for "unreasonably dangerous" determined by expectations 
of ultimate user, the painter, not his employer). 
53. .Y( Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Or. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971) ("unreasonably dan-
gerous" not determined by expectations of driver in one car who was injured by second car). 
54. .Y( Rheingold, WluIt aT( 1M ConsuouT'.r "R(osonaok ExjJ(ctoti'ons"?, 29 Bus. LAw. 589, 593 
n.l6 (1967). 
55. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 
(1978) (citing Wade, supra note 1, at 829). 
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unable to recover for his injuries because he did not have the requisite 
expectation. Another type of case in which the test does not provide 
suitable results occurs in situations in which products with a dangerous 
or unsafe reputation cause a consumer's injury. In such cases, ordinary 
consumers, anticipating the possibility of being injured by such a prod-
uct, would also be denied recovery. 56 
.D. The Rislc-Utililjl Test 
Under the risk-utility test, either the judge or the jury can determine 
whether the magnitude of the risk of harm presented by a product's 
design outweighs its utility in order to hold the manufacturer liable. 57 
Under this test, a manufacturer is liable for injuries caused to a con-
sumer engaged in a reasonably foreseeable use or misuse of the product, 
if the judge or the jury finds that a reasonably prudent manufacturer 
would not have marketed such a product after considering its hazards 
and utility as well as the ease of adopting an alternative safer design. 58 
In applying the risk-utility test, courts weigh a number of factors to 
determine whether the product's design subjects a user to an unreasona-
ble risk of injury. 59 Many courts that apply this test consider the follow-
ing factors in balancing a product's overall risks and utility: (1) its 
usefulness and desirability to both the user and the general public; (2) 
the likelihood and potential seriousness of injury; (3) the availability of 
safer alternatives; (4) the ease and expense with which the manufacturer 
could modify the design to eliminate its unsafe character without im-
pairing its utility; (5) the user's ability to avoid danger by exercising care 
in its use; (6) the user's awareness of the inherent dangers, either because 
of the product's obvious unsafe condition or the existence of suitable 
56. Id. at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233. 
57. See Rmaoed Conlrotmsy, supra note 3, at 775 n.lO. For further discussion of the respective 
roles of the judge and jury in a risk-utility analysis, see notes 67-82 & accompanying text l;yra. 
58. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 163, 172-74,386 A.2d 816, 821, 825-28 
(1978). One court has explained its preference for this test on the grounds that a finding of a design 
defect by balancing the diverse factors relating to its desirability and dangerousness represents a 
determination that the design is "wrong"; the court, therefore, is justified in imposing legal respon-
sibility for the resulting harm. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 883 (Alaska 1979). 
59. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (automobile manu-
facturer under a duty to avoid unreasonable risk); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 
201,321 A.2d 737 (1974) (negligent automobile design subjected user to unreasonable risk during 
"second collision'); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152,386 A.2d 816 (1978) (feasibility 
and expense of installing safety lock weighed against risk of harm renders product unreasonably 
dangerous); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976) 
(photo-offset press machine manufacturer liable if plaintiff exposed to unreasonable risk of harm); 
Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974) (where only six or seven cases of inadvertent 
hood openings reported in seven or eight years, jury could find risk of injury not unreasonable); 
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (failure to construct car 
roofs with roll bars or roll capes exposed user to unreasonable risk), rev'd on other groundt, 584 S.W.2d 
844 (Tex. 1979). See also Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971). 
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warnings or instructions; and (7) the manufacturer's ability to absorb 
the loss through price adjustments or liability insurance.60 In cases in-
volving alleged defects in the crashworthiness of automobiles,61 for ex-
ample, courts following the risk-utility test weigh the style, type, and 
particular purpose of the automobile,62 the price of the automobile,63 
the cost of changing the design to eliminate the risk,64 the nature of the 
accident that resulted in plaintiff's injury,65 and the extent to which an 
alternative design proposed by the plaintiff would pose a safety hazard 
greater than that of the existing design.66 
Courts that follow the risk-utility test in design defect cases disagree 
on the nature of the respective roles of the judge and the jury in a jury 
trial.67 Some courts require the trial judge to apply the risk-utility test 
only to determine whether to send a design defect case to a jury. In these 
jurisdictions, the jury applies a design defect standard that differs from 
60. These factors are suggested in Wade, supra note 1, at 837·38. Se~ General Elec. Co. v. 
Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 364, 498 P.2d 366, 369 (1972) (injury arising despite reasonable care in product's 
use). Se~ also Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 172-74, 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (1978). 
Cj'. Fischer, supra note 3, at 359 (listing 15 factors courts should consider in imposing strict liability). 
It should be noted that some jurisdictions that have rejected the patent defect rule,s~~ note 18supra, 
nevertheless consider the obvious character of the defect as one factor in the overall balancing 
process. Se~ Dorsey v. Yoder, 331 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), qffd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 
1973); if. Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282,252 A.2d 855 (1969) (no liability where 
position of power lawnmower blade was obvious and not latent defect); s~~ note 18 supra. 
61. Se~ note I supra. 
62. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072 (4th Cir. 1974) (citing 
Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969», in which the court stated 
that a "convertible could not be made 'as safe in roll-over accidents as a standard four-door sedan 
with center posts and full-door frames.'" Se~ also Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 
P.2d 47 (1971) (intended purpose of 4O-ton earth-mover should be considered in determining if it 
was designed negligently). 
63. Se~ Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir. 1974) (Cadillac 
may be expected to afford greater protection than economy car). 
64. Se~ Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 218, 321 A.2d 737, 746 (1974) (in 
determining reasonableness of design, cost of design change must be weighed against resulting 
amount of added protection). 
65. "It could not reasonably be argued that a car manufacturer should be held liable because 
its vehicle collapsed when involved in a head-on collision with a large truck, at high speed." Dyson 
v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969), fjUO/~d in Dreisonstok v. Volkswa-
genwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir. 1974). A related legal principle in products liability 
law holds a manufacturer liable for injuries caused by any foreseeable use of a product, with fore-
seeability a question of fact for the jury except where the accident occurs in a manner so "bizarre" 
that reasonable minds could not differ. Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 
587, 398 A.2d 490, 496 (1979), rev'ri on other grounds suO nom. General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 
Md. 714,410 A.2d 1039 (1980). A plaintifi; however, does not have to establish that the particular 
manner in which the harm occurs or the accident happens was reasonably foreseeable. Se~, ~.g., 
Eshbach v. W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940, 943 (3d Cir. 1973) (liability is not dependent on the 
ability to foresee the manner in which a lawnmower will be put to its foreseeable use); Newman v. 
Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 564 P.2d 674 (1977) (inquiry should focus on foreseeable 
uses of product, not foreseeability of harm). 
66. Se~ Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, r~hean"ngdmi~d, 282 Or. 411, 
579 P.2d 1287 (1978); O'Donnell, lR.rign LI~igalion and Sirict Lia/;i/ity: The /tob/em ofJuty Insl17J&tions 
Which lJo Nol Insl17J&l, 56 J. URB. L. 1051, 1060 (1979). 
67. See gmera/IJ' O'Donnell, supra note 66. 
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the one the judge applies in determining whether to send the case to the 
jury. The Oregon Supreme Court, for example, requires the trial judge 
to apply the risk-utility test in deciding whether to send a design defect 
case to the jury; the trial judge then instructs the jury under the user-
oriented or the seller-oriented approach of the consumer expectations 
test.68 Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court requires the trial judge 
to apply the risk-utility test initially to determine if the case should go to 
the jury. The court then requires the judge to charge the jury "in terms 
of whether the product was reasonably fit . . . for its intended or fore-
seeable purposes when inserted by the defendant into the strea~ of com-
merce and, if not, whether as a result damage or injury was incurred by 
the contemplated users or others who might reasonably be expected to 
come in contact with it."69 When warranted by the particular factual 
situation or by the nature of the defect, the court will tailor its instruc-
tions to focus the jury's attention on any of the factors generally consid-
ered under the risk-utility balancing test for which specific proof exists. 70 
In Azzarello y. Blacle Brothers CO.,71 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
implicitly adopted the risk-utility test by indicating that the question of 
whether a product's design is defective and unreasonably dangerous 
within the meaning of section 402A of the Restatement involved a deter-
mination that the unavoidable danger it may pose outweighs its util-
ity.72 The court stated that this determination is a question oflaw, the 
resolution of which depends upon social policy rather than a factual 
dispute otherwise reserved for the jury. 73 In adopting an approach simi-
lar to that of the Oregon Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania court de-
cided that application of the risk-utility test constituted a judicial 
determination of whether the case should go to the jury; the judge 
should then instruct the jury that it must determine whether the facts 
support the averments in the complaint.74 The court in Azzarello held 
that a jury instruction suggesting that a product is defective if it is un-
reasonably dangerous is a reversible error because it fails to provide a 
juror with adequate guidance.75 The court stated that once the matter is 
before the jury, the judge should instruct the jury that it "may find a 
defect where the product left the supplier's control lacking any element 
necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature 
68. Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 463-64, 525 P.2d 125, 128-29 (1974). See notes 33-56 & 
accompanying text supra. 
69. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 176, 406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979). 
70. Id.; Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 174-75,386 A.2d 816, 827 (1978). 
71. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978). 
72. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026. 
73. It!. See gmnalfy O'Donnell, supra note 66, at 1070-74. 
74. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 558, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1978). 
75. Id. 
1981] DESIGN DEFECT STANDARD 657 
that renders it unsafe for the intended use."76 
Several courts that require the jury to apply the risk-utility test do not 
provide guidance regarding the standard to be applied by the trial judge 
in deciding whether to send a design defect case to a jury. The courts 
also do not require jury instructions to explain the factors that the jury 
should weigh in applying the risk-utility balancing test. In Alaska, for 
example, the trial judge is not required to determine that the evidence is 
sufficient to enable a jury reasonably to find for the plaintiff on the issue 
of proximate cause before submitting the plaintiff's case to the jury.77 
The jury is instructed to find the design defective if the plaintiff proves 
that the design proximately caused his injury and if the defendant is 
unable to prove that the benefits of the challenged design outweighed its 
risk of harm.78 
The somewhat different approach by a Texas court similarly fails to 
require the jury to be directed to consider any specific criteria in weigh-
ing the risk of harm against the product's utility and relies instead upon 
the evidence proffered by the parties to direct the jury's attention to 
relevant criteria.79 The Texas approach requires the jury to be in-
structed simply that it should find a design to be defective if it is "unrea-
sonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of 
the product and the risk involved in its use."80 Unlike the Alaska ap-
proach, however, the Texas approach does have the trial judge apply 
the risk-utility balancing test to the proffered evidence to determine if 
the case should initially be allowed to go to the jury; it does not inform 
the tri(~.l judge, however, as to which criteria should be applied in per-
forming this review. Furthermore, the trial judge is given no guidance 
for determining whether evidence proffered by the parties with respect 
to the risk-utility test should be admissible as relevant and material. 
The Alaska approach affords less guidance to the manufacturer than 
the Oregon, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas approaches regarding 
safety features that a manufacturer ought to incorporate into the prod-
uct.8! While the other four states that use the risk-utility test require the 
76. Id. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027. 
77. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979). The Alaska court actually 
adopted a two-pronged standard, one prong of which is the risk-utility test that was first proprosed 
by the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). See notes 102-23 & accompanying text ir!fTa. Although the Alaska court did 
not adopt only the risk-utility test, the court's comments relative to the risk-utility prong like the 
narw standard are applicable to a general discussion of this test. 
78. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979). 
79. Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (rex. 1979). 
80. Id. at 847. 
81. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the likely consequences of an approach of 
this type will be a marked increase in directed verdicts for the plaintiff. Henderson, Products Li'abil-
il.J: California's Mw Test for lksign lJeflets, 1 CoRPORATION L. REv. 372, 374 (1978). 
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judge to make an initial risk-utility determination of whether to submit 
the case to the jury, Alaska neither requires such a determination nor 
provides guidance regarding what factors to consider in the jury's subse-
quent cost-benefit analysis. Although the other four states provide 
greater guidance by having the trial judge determine whether to submit 
the case to the jury, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas, like Alaska, do 
not require the judge to bring the relevant factors to the jury's attention. 
Indeed, the Pennsylvania approach in Azzareflo provides the jury with 
an instruction that suggests that the manufacturer must take every pre-
caution, regardless of cost.82 Under the holding in Azzareflo, manufac-
turers may well be held liable in all design defect cases submitted to the 
jury, subject only to appellate review of a trial judge's initial application 
of the risk-utility test. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court's approach, by contrast, provides a 
manufacturer with a greater degree of guidance in designing a product. 
Under this approach, both the judge and the jury have to agree that the 
manufacturer misapplied the risk-utility analysis before finding his ap-
plication of the test invalid.83 Although a manufacturer can never be 
entirely sure that he has designed the product to incorporate all the 
safety features required by law, the judge-jury relationship under this 
approach affords the most guidance. 
The appellate courts that have adopted the risk-utility test have not 
specified whether all relevant factors must be weighed equally. This lack 
of specificity regarding the weight of the relevant factors complicates a 
manufacturer's application of the risk-utility test during the design pro-
cess. Indeed, a judge or a jury, or both, may give different weight to the 
relevant factors than did the manufacturer. Furthermore, not all of the 
factors considered relevant under the risk-utility analysis can be reduced 
to objective monetary terms. Certainly, the cost of developing an alter-
native design and its ll:ltimate effect on the product's price can be de-
fined precisely in economic terms. Other factors, however, such as the 
effect of an alternative design upon the product's utility, are more elu-
sive. Economists can define the loss of a human life or a serious injury in 
economic terms,84 yet the precise economic value to be placed upon 
these casualties certainly will engender substantial disagreement.85 
82. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 558-59, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026-27 (1978). &1 
Henderson, Producls Liabililjl: ConlrolMTsial New Decision on Design Deflcls, 2 CORPORATION L. REV. 
246, 248 (1979). 
83. Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 173-75, 180-82,386 A.2d 816, 826-27, 829-
31 (1978). 
84. &e W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 489-91 (1980). 
85. Id. (provides estimated values of a lost life by the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration and the National Center for Health Statistics). 
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Judges, juries, or both, are likely to reject a purely economic analysis 
that seeks to justify a failure to incorporate certain design changes when 
loss of human life or serious personal injury is involved.86 Consequently, 
the subjective nature of weighing some of the relevant factors under this 
test makes the manufacturer's task extremely difficult. Despite earnest 
efforts to weigh all factors, the manufacturer can never do more than 
second guess how a judge or a jury might apply the test. Although the 
risk-utility test specifies criteria for the manufacturer to weigh during 
the design process that will be reviewed by a judge or a jury, the test 
cannot provide absolute guidance to a manufacturer regarding what 
safety features are required in the product's design.87 
E. Th~ California Hybna T~st 
The California Supreme Court has adopted a hybrid design defect 
test under which a design is held defective if it is found inadequate 
under either the consumer expectations test or the risk-utility test. In 
Bar/c~r lJ. LuI! Engin~mng CO.,88 the California court held that in a design 
defect case for strict liability in tort, a two-pronged test should be ap-
plied to determine a manufacturer's liability. First, under the consumer 
expectations test, a manufacturer may be held strictly liable if the prod-
uct does not meet the safety expectations of the ordinary consumer who 
uses the product for its intended purpose or in a reasonably foreseeable 
manner. Alternatively, notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to satisfy 
the requirements of the first test, the manufacturer can be held liable if 
the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused his in-
juries, and the manufacturer fails to demonstrate that the challenged 
design's benefits outweigh its inherent risk of harm.89 
The court in Bar/c~ found the first test analogous to the implied war-
ranty of merchantability of the Uniform Commercial Code90 and noted 
that it would consider circumstantial evidence in finding a product de-
86. &~ id. at 490-91. 
87. See Henderson, supra note 1, at 1565, which suggests that if a manufacturer establishes at 
trial that he made a good faith effort to apply the risk-utility test in making the design decision, the 
trial judge will likely refuse to allow the case to go to the jury. 
/d. 
88. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). 
89. /d. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40. 
[A] product is defective in design (i) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed 
to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or 
reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that the product's design 
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant 
factors . . . that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of 
danger inherent in such design. 
90. Id. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236 . .see U.C.C. § 2-314 {"Unless excluded or 
modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract 
for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.''). 
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fective under this test, even if the accident precluded identification of 
the specific design defect.91 The court stated that the second test, the 
risk-utility analysis with the burden of proof on the manufacturer, was 
necessary because consumers frequently know little or nothing about 
safety standards.92 Under this approach, a jury, in evaluating the ade-
quacy of a product's design, would consider such factors as the dangers 
inherent in the challenged design, the probability of such danger, the 
financial and mechanical feasibility of alternative designs, and any ad-
verse consequences of an alternative design.93 In a decision subsequent 
to Barker, the California Supreme Court suggested that the nature of 
the plaintiff's use of the product was also a relevant factor to be consid-
ered under the risk-utility analysis of the second Barker test.94 
The plaintiff in a design defect case has an inherent disadvantage in 
obtaining the relevant information to prove his case, because only the 
manufacturer may know most of the relevant factors to be weighed 
under the risk-utility analysis.95 In order to remedy this dilemma, the 
court in Barker held that where a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case 
that the product's design proximately caused his injuries, the burden of 
proof rests on the defendant to show that the design was not defective 
under a risk-utility analysis.96 Thus, to sustain his burden and avoid 
liability, the defendant must show that the benefits of the challenged 
design outweigh the risk of harm. Recognizing the fact that design de-
fect cases implicitly involve a determination of the design's reasonable-
ness with respect to its risks and benefits, the court determined that the 
term "unreasonably dangerous" would not be required in California in 
91. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,236 
(1978). This is a questionable proposition with respect to alleged design defects. If destruction of 
the product precludes identification of the specific defect that proximately caused plaintiff's inju-
ries, then the plaintiff could not prove conclusively that a defect in the product's design itself proxi-
mately caused his injury. Although a plaintiff cannot prove conclusively that the defect was one of 
design or manufacture, he still can prove by circumstantial evidence that the product was defective 
when it left the defendant's control. Se~, ~.g., Moraca v. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.]. 454, 332 A.2d 599 
(1975) (circumstantial proof of defect sufficient to support inference that defect was proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries); Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 326 A.2d 673 (1974) 
(age, prior usage of product, durability, and effective operation without maintenance are circum-
stantial factors to be considered in determining whether inference is permissible that defect existed 
at time product left defendant's control). 
92 .. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 
(1978) (citing Wade, supra note 1, at 829). 
93. Jd. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. 
94. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 731-43,575 P.2d 1162, 1165-73, 144 Cal. 
Rptr. 380,383-91 (1978) (plaintiff's conduct relative to product is examined and his recovery re-
duced to extent his own lack of reasonable care contributed to his injury). 
95. Jd. at 748, 575 P.2d at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 395. 
96. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 433, 573 P.2d 443, 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238 
(1978). The implications of the impact of the court's allocation of the burden of proof are analyzed 
in ReMw~d Controversy, supra note 3, at 782-97. 
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a strict liability action under section 402A of the Restatement.97 
Although the court indicated that a plaintiff who fails to show that a 
product was designed defectively under the ordinary consumer expecta-
tions test can still prove design defectiveness under the risk-utility test, it 
did not address expressly whether liability could be imposed upon a 
manufacturer who has indeed sustained his burden under the risk-utility 
test.98 The court suggested, however, that a manufacturer who met his 
burden under the risk-utility test might be held liable under the ordi-
nary consumer expectations test.99 The uncertainty regarding the impo-
sition of liability on a party who has satisfied his burden has resulted in 
at least one court rejecting the Barker approach on the grounds that it 
97. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432·34, 573 P.2d 443, 456-57, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 
238·39 (1978). The "unreasonably dangerous" element was first eliminated by the California 
Supreme Court in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 
(1972) (manufacturing defect case). The justification for such a change was the court's concern 
that a strict liability in tort standard that follows § 402A literally might force a plaintiff to prove 
that a product was defective tmd unreasonably dangerous. The court cited this double burden of 
proof as unduly burdensome to an injured plaintiff. It interpreted such an increased burden as 
inconsistent with the development of strict liability in tort, a doctrine that sought to eliminate the 
problems of proof inherent in pursuing claims of negligence and warranty. By eliminating the 
"unreasonably dangerous" element, the court in Cronin sought to remove any taint of a negligence 
standard in imposing strict liability on a manufacturer. Id. at 133-34,501 P.2d at 1162-63, 104 Cal. 
Rptr. at 441-43. The court in Boder found this holding in Cronin equally applicable to a design 
defect case. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 
228 (1978). 
Courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey also have rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" ele-
ment in strict liability actions. oUt', t'.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 
A.2d 140 (1979) (design defect cases); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 
893 (1975) (design defect and manufacturing defect cases). Other courts, however, have rejected 
the approach in Cronin. oUt', t'.g., Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976); Pothoff 
v. Alms, 41 Colo. App. 51, 583 P.2d 309 (1978); Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 110,240 
N.W.2d 154 (1976). These courts, relying upon comments g and i to § 402A of the Restatement, 
argue that defective products may not be unreasonably dangerous and should not result in liability. 
As stated by the court in Ross v. Up-right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1968), the requirement 
"that the defect render the product unreasonably dangerous reflects a realization that many prod-
ucts ... have both utility and danger." oUt' also Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shrivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 
(Tex. 1977) (no recovery in strict liability action seeking to recover damages solely for economic loss 
because if defect does not cause damage other than that caused to product itself, product is not 
unreasonably dangerous). 
In a decision following Barker, the California court held that the issue of defective design is to be 
determined by consideration of the product as a whole, and not solely from the standpoint of the 
product's alleged defectively designed component. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 
746-47,575 P.2d 1162, 1174-75, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 392-93 (1978). A court should consider all 
safety features of the product in determining whether the manufacturer designed the product defec-
tively. Id. at 747, 575 P.2d at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 393. 
98. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-34, 573 P.2d 443, 452-57, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 
234-39 (1978). The court did not address the issue of whether a manufacturer could be held liable 
for a design defect when both parties have satisfied their burdens of proof. If both parties satisfied 
their burdens, the jury might then decide in favor of the more persuasive or more effective litigant. 
q. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 101 (Tex. 1974) Uohnson,J., dissenting) (in two-
pronged ordinary consumer expectations test and risk-utility balancing by manufacturer, both par-
ties could satisfy burdens of proof, thus forcing jury to choose which side developed stronger case). 
99. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430 n.lO, 573 P.2d 443, 455 n.lO, 143 Cal. Rptr. 
225, 237 n.1O (1978). 
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could confuse a jury.lOO 
While the court in Barleer also failed to address directly the issue of 
liability for dangerous products lacking safer alternative designs, the 
court suggested that liability might be imposed for ultrahazardous prod-
uctS. lOl The possibility of imposing liability for products that normally 
are dangerous suggests that a judge or a jury would be able to impose 
liability under the first standard, the ordinary consumer expectations 
test, where the product fails to afford consumers, ultimate users, or by-
standers a minimum degree of protection. Accordingly, a court could 
impose liability on the manufacturer even if he met his burden under 
the risk-utility weighing test. In such a case, the manufacturer would be 
liable for an ultrahazardous product even though he demonstrated that 
no safer alternative design was available or that an alternative design 
would make the product too expensive for ordinary c0I.1sumers. I02 Simi-
larly, even if the manufacturer demonstrated that the alternative design 
would adversely affect the product's ability to function as intended, lia-
bility might still be imposed if it were judged to be inherently 
dangerous. I03 
The Alaska Supreme Court, which adopted the Barleer test, did not 
use precisely the same procedure as California in applying the hybrid 
standard.104 Under the Barleer approach, the trial judge first must deter-
mine that it would be reasonable for the jury to find for the plaintiff 
before instructing the jury under the two tests. I05 The Alaska court, by 
contrast, does not require the trial judge, before sending the case to the 
jury, to apply the risk-utility test to determine if the jury could reason-
100. Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 176 Mont. 123,576 P.2d 725 (1978). The Supreme Court 
of Montana rejected a confusing jury instruction that defined the "unreasonably dangerous" reo 
quirement in the different contexts of the ordinary consumer expectations test and the risk-utility 
balancing by the manufacturer. The court in Simberg did not object to the "unreasonably" danger-
ous standard as did the court in Barker. Rather, the confusion that the court in StOlberg cited 
emanated from the inherent difficulty in choosing the proper viewpoint, that of the ordinary con-
sumer or the prudent manufacturer. Whether the product is designated as unreasonably dangerous 
would depend upon the viewpoint adopted. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 
(rex. 1979), in which the court affirmed a jury instruction that framed "unreasonably dangerous" 
solely in the context of the ordinary consumer expectations test and omitted the prudent manufac-
turer risk-utility test. In so doing, the court in TU17/U rejected the bifurcated approach exemplified 
by Barker. Id. at 851. 
101. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 
(1978) (citing Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 383, 482 P.2d 681, 684, 93 Cal. Rptr. 
769, 772 (1971». 
102. Set' notes 62-64 & accompanying text supra. Risk-utility tests in crashworthiness design 
defect cases weigh style and type of automobile, its particular purpose, the price of the automobile, 
and the cost of changing the design to eliminate the risk. Id. 
103. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,236 
(1978). Other courts have also recognized that a product must meet minimum safety standards. 
See, e.g., cases cited in note 142 ;'!fra. 
104. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979). 
105. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). 
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ably find for the plaintiff. 106 The failure of a judge to screen the test 
initially, however, allows the jury to decide cases by whim or caprice. 
Moreover, in adopting the Barker approach, the Alaska Supreme Court 
fails to give the jury any guidance regarding the application of the ordi-
nary consumer expectations test, and thus it does not promote the devel-
opment of safety guidelines for manufacturers. 107 
F. Professor Henderson's Test 
The sixth identified products liability design defect standard is based 
upon Professor James Henderson's thesis that courts should not find a 
product's design to be defective if the design is the result of a manufac-
turer's conscious choice and if certain criteria are met.108 Manufacturer 
compliance with applicable safety standards promulgated by the legisla-
ture or an administrative agency would preclude liability under Hen-
derson's test. In the absence of applicable governmental standards, any 
product that is accompanied by an adequate warning of the risks 
presented by its design or that has an obvious inherent risk would not be 
adjudged defective.109 
The Michigan Court of Appeals, relying upon Henderson's thesis, has 
adopted a similar standard. 1 10 In order to establish a prima facie case, a 
106. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979). The court stated that it did 
not "think it necessary to have a two-tier system where the trial judge, before giving the case to the 
jury, must first find that it would be reasonable for the jury to find for the plaintiff." ld. at 884. 
107. The New Jersey approach, by contrast, which allows the judge to screen the test initially, 
furthers the goal of furnishing manufacturers precise guidelines concerning required safety features. 
&1 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 173-74,386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (1978). Moreover, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected Borin's ordinary consumer expectations test on the 
grounds that ordinary consumers have no expertise that would enable them to determine how 
safely a product could be designed. The Borin approach to the ordinary consumer expectations 
test was also rejected because the court found the implied warranty of merchantability test irrele-
vant in a strict liability action alleging a design defect. 
lOB. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1552-73; f)eflet Litigation, supra note 3, at 793-94. Henderson 
distinguishes designs resulting from conscious design choices from inadvertent design errors. Hen-
derson,supra note 1, at 1547. Henderson cites the selection of raw materials of insufficient strength, 
fa. at 1548-49, and hidden dangers, id. at 1550, as examples of inadvertent design defects. 
109. la. at 1559-60. If governmental regulations specify the warnings and instructions that 
must accompany the product, strict compliance with such regulations in the drafting of accompa-
nying warnings and instructions would probably absolve the manufacturer from liability under 
Henderson's test. &,, I.g., Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1274 (1976). 
110. Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74,268 N.W.2d 291 (1978). In Owens, 
plaintiff's spouse was killed when a forklift truck he was operating overturned. Plaintiff, in a strict 
liability action against the truck's manufacturer, alleged that the truck was defectively designed 
because it lacked seat belts and a protective enclosure for the driver. The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's granting of a directed verdict for the defendant on the grounds that 
no industry or governmental regulation required installation of such devices. &1 also Temple v. 
Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977) (manufacturer who fails to give 
suitable warning of product's dangerous propensity guilty of negligence). The court in Tnnpll, 
adopting Restatement § 402A, cited commentj, which states that "[i]n order to prevent the prod-
uct from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warnings 
. . . as to its use." 
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plaintiff alleging a defective design must show that the particular design 
did not conform with a predetermined standard set, for example, by the 
industry or by government regulation. Alternatively, a plaintiff can es-
tablish a prima facie case by showing that the inherent risks of the de-
sign are latent and that the manufacturer has failed to provide an 
adequate warning to potential users about such risks. III 
Henderson does not disagree with the almost universally accepted 
principle that a manufacturer is not immune from liability in a common 
law suit for injuries proximately caused by a product's defective de-
sign,112 regardless of whether it complies with current legislative or ad-
ministrative safety standards. 113 Henderson, however, argues that 
courts should defer to governmental standards because judges and juries 
have neither the expertise nor the competence to evaluate and ade-
quately comprehend the complex tradeoffs made by design engineers 
during a conscious design process. 1l4 Moreover, he believes adjudica-
tion is a totally inappropriate process for determining the adequacy of a 
product's design because it allows judges and juries to impose liability 
upon manufacturers on an arbitrary basis.115 
Under Henderson's theory, courts would not be required to establish 
independent design standards in cases of inadvertent design errors. 
Rather, liability would depend upon whether the plaintiff established 
that "conformance by the defendant manufacturer to customary engi-
neering practices would have prevented the product failure .... "116 
One problem that a court or a jury faces in applying this test is the 
determination of whether a danger presented by a product's design re-
sults from an inadvertent design error or a conscious design choice. The 
various articles in which Henderson has presented his approach provide 
111. Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74,81,268 N.W.2d 291, 295 (1978). 
112. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 506 (8th Cir. 1968) (National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, § 108(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1976), cited as federal 
standard not precluding common law liability: "Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety 
standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under com-
mon law.'). 
113. Federal automobile design safety standards, first established by Congress in 1966, were 
intended to supplement rather than obviate the law of negligence and products liability. See, e.g., 
Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), Teu'ri on other grounds, 
584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). 
114. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1577. 
115. Id. at 1558. Henderson cites irresistible social pressure that generally favors injured plain-
tiffs as an underlying factor in the unsuitability of adjudication for determining design standards. 
Henderson notes that "[c]ourts would inevitably resort to some form of judicial coin-flipping, i.e., 
they would begin to determine defendants' liability on some arbitrary basis rather than on the 
purported basis of the reasonableness of the product designs brought before them." Id. 
116. Id. at 1552. Henderson states that the courts' ability to delegate successfully these stan-
dards to the engineering profession is the result of the self-defeating nature of inadvertant errors. 
The intended design serves as a standard to condemn the actual design. 
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no test to guide judges or juries in making this determination. 117 Fur-
ther, if the inadvertent design error standard is applied, Henderson 
would measure the adequacy of the product's design by determining the 
collective or customary standards of the engineering profession. Hender-
son, however, does not state what test should be applied if members of 
the engineering profession disagree about customary practices. Hender-
son also does not suggest what a court should do if a defendant estab-
lishes that his inadvertent design error conforms with universally 
accepted engineering standards and the standards are found to be inad-
equate or unsafe. Henderson cites, and appears to accept, the rule fol-
lowed by most courts that compliance with industry norms is not the 
standard to determine the adequacy of a product's design. 1 is He fails to 
explain, however, why courts should defer to customary engineering 
practices but not to industry standards. Industry standards often will be 
based upon, and thus be indistinguishable from, customary engineering 
practices. Absolute deference to customary engineering practices-:-as-
suming that such practices can be defined-would seem just as objec-
tionable as absolute deference to industry standards. 
Henderson's test for evaluating designs that are the result of conscious 
design choices would exempt manufacturers from liability for a defec-
tive design if two conditions are met. In the absence of government 
safety standards, a manufacturer would not be held liable if he enclosed 
adequate warnings and instructions with the product and if the design's 
risks were reasonably obvious. Henderson would exempt manufacturers 
from liability in these two situations, regardless of whether an inexpen-
sive alternative that would not adversely affect the design could elimi-
nate or minimize the risks. 
Reliance on warnings rather than on minimum safety design stan-
dards, however, might not protect all parties who may have some form 
of contact with the dangerous product. For instance, a written warning 
would not adequately protect persons who do not encounter the warn-
ings or do not comprehend the product's dangers. These persons in-
clude children, unsophisticated or illiterate users of a product, and 
bystanders. 119 As a matter of public policy, courts should require manu-
117. Twerski, Weinstein, Danaher & Piehler, supra note 3, at 528-32. 
118. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1557. One rationale for this rule is that the lack of adequate 
safety in a product design may be common throughout an entire industry. Id. Evidence of industry 
custom has been admitted and has had an impact upon decisions affecting product safety. Id. 
Courts following this rule may not defer absolutely to product design standards established by the 
industry or by authoritative voluntary associations. &e, e.g., Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 
Mich. App. 74, 268 N.W.2d 291 (1978); see also notes 110-11 & accompanying text supra. 
119. &e gmnall)' Field, The YOlIIIg C01lSURU1": A Paradigm A1/4l)'sis of the Roles of Public and PrilJ(Jle 
Low in Prtvmling and Redressing Ityuries, 29 MERCER L. REv. 523 (1978); Phillips, ProdtJCls Liability for 
Pmonalltyiny 10 Minors, 56 VA. L. REv. 1223 (1970). 
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facturers to incorporate feasible and inexpensive features in their prod-
ucts to protect such persons from injury.120 This requirement should be 
imposed even though warnings or instructions concerning the product's 
risks adequately protect most consumers. Similarly unprotected are 
those persons who understand explicit warnings or who appreciate the 
risks involved but are powerless to respond effectively to such warnings 
or risks. Despite the lack of protection afforded these two classes of per-
sons in the absence of minimum safety design standards, Henderson 
does not alter his test for these situations.121 
Henderson asserts that his conscious design choice test will eliminate 
the need for judicial review of the complex tradeoffs involved in the 
design process. Judges that follow the test, however, will be required to 
undertake a similar task if relevant government safety standards, with 
which the product's design complies, are challenged as being arbitrary 
and capricious. 122 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an admin-
istrative agency's regulations can be held invalid if found by a court to 
be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 123 The administra-
tive action will be held arbitrary and capricious if the agency in promul-
gating its regulations did not consider all factors relevant to the exercise 
of its statutory authority or if it made a clear error in judgment. 124 
The Consumer Product Safety Commission, for example, in establish-
ing safety standards to govern a particular product's design, is required 
to undertake a risk-utility analysis125 similar to the risk-utility design 
120. Su text accompanying notes 141-43 ir!fia. 
121. Henderson, supra note 1, at 1560 n.122. 
122. See Henderson, Mamifacturer's LialJi/,{y for .Deflaive Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Rifonn, 
56 N.C.L. REV. 625, 639-40 (1978). 
123. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). 
124. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (court must decide 
whether Secretary exceeded powers delegated by Congress). 
125. The Consumer Product Safety Commission is authorized to establish requirements re-
garding the design of products, 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a)(I)(A) (1976), when "reasonably necessary to 
prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product." Id. § 2056(a)(I). 
The Commission is required to consider, prior to promUlgating a design standard: 
A) the degree and nature of the risk of injury the rule is designed to eliminate or reduce; 
B) the approximate number of consumer products, or types or classes thereof, subject to 
such rule; 
C) the need of the public for the consumer products subject to such rule, and the proba-
ble effect of such rule upon the utility, cost, or availability of such products to meet 
such need; and 
D) any means of achieving the objective of the order while minimizing adverse effects on 
competition or disruption or dislocation of manufacturing and other commercial 
practices consistent with the public health and safety. 
15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(I) (1976). The Commission shall not promulgate a consumer product safety 
rule unless it finds: 
A) that the rule (including its effective date) is reasonably necessary to eliminate or re-
duce an unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product; 
B) that the promulgation of the rule is in the public interest; and 
C) in the case of a rule declaring the product a banned hazardous product, that no 
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defect test.126 A court reviewing the Commission's risk-utility analysis 
must defer to its decision if the agency considered all relevant factors. 
The court cannot substitute its weighing of these factors for the 
agency's.127 Despite this limitation, a judge reviewing a Commission 
standard in a conscious-design-choice case would be involved in a pro-
cess similar to a determination of whether to send a design defect case to 
the jury. 128 Determining whether an agency acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in applying a risk-utility analysis does not differ significantly 
from applying the risk-utility test to determine if reasonable jurors could 
disagree about the adequacy of a product's design. 
Henderson does not suggest a test that a court should apply in a con-
scious-design-choice case where the product's design conforms to a gov-
ernment safety standard held invalid on procedural or substantive 
grounds under the Administrative Procedure Act. 129 Presumably, the 
court would apply the test that is followed in circumstances in which 
there is no applicable government standard, thereby not subjecting a 
manufacturer to liability if the product contained adequate warnings 
and instructions. If this presumption is correct, by accompanying the 
product with appropriate warnings and instructions, a manufacturer 
whose product's design conforms to applicable government standards 
can guard against the possibility of liability for injuries if the standard is 
declared invalid. 
Henderson's design defect test gives the manufacturer more guidance 
regarding the product's requisite features than do the other tests. Yet it 
leaves some uncertainties for the manufacturer, such as the determina-
tion of whether a design complies with applicable government standards 
and whether, in the absence of government standards, the product's 
warnings and instructions adequately apprise consumers of the risks 
presented by the design and the procedures necessary to avoid such 
risks. 
III. A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE DESIGN DEFECT STANDARD 
Although at least six tests have been posited for determining whether 
a design is defective, with variations in application regarding the judge-
jury relationship making the number of tests even greater, each test is in 
feasible consumer product safety standard under this chapter would adequately pro-
tect the public from the unreasonable risk of injury associated with such products. 
Ii. § 2058(c)(2). S .... ouo National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, ii. § 1392(f)(3). 
126. St~ notes 57-87 & accompanying text supra. St~ ouo Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 
Or. 61, 82-83, 577 P.2d 1322, 1332-36 (1978) (Linde,]., concurring) (comparing FAA aircraft safety 
standards with Oregon's product liability standards for design defects). 
127. S~~ Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 4{)1 U.S. 4{)2, 416 (1971). 
128. St~ text accompanying notes 67-82 supra. 
129. St~ 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). 
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some way inadequate. The present standards do not require the judge 
or the jury, as a prerequisite to imposing liability upon a manufacturer, 
to find that an alternative design exists that is technologically feasible 
and that would have prevented plaintiff's injuries. Furthermore, by not 
considering such an alternative design, the courts also fail to examine 
whether a different design would produce a more efficient allocation of 
the manufacturer's and society's resources, as determined by a marginal 
cost~benefit analysis. 
The test proposed in this article provides a variation of the risk-utility 
test by initially focusing upon alternative designs that would reduce or 
eliminate the risk of danger presented by the existing design. The pro-
posed test would weigh the marginal benefits and utilities afforded by 
each alternative design against its marginal costs and risks. 130 The cost 
and feasibility of a safer design is one factor that currently is weighed 
under the risk-utility test,131 but it is weighed along with other factors in 
a subjective balancing approach that does not give the manufacturer 
exact guidance regarding safety features required in his product. 132 
Under the proposed test, the plaintiff first would have to establish that 
there was a technically feasible, alternative design available at the time 
the product was designed. The plaintiff must show that this alternative 
would have prevented or at least minimized the injuries caused by the 
product's design, and that the marginal benefits and utilities resulting 
from adoption of the alternative safety feature outweigh its marginal 
costs and risks. 133 The test would take into account the extent to which 
the risk of harm presented by the existing design is patent or obvious or 
is brought to the attention of consumers and bystanders by warnings or 
instructions. Under the proposed test, however, "when an unreasonable 
danger could have been eliminated without excessive cost or loss of 
product efficiency, liability may attach even though the danger was ob-
vious or there was adequate warning."134 
130. See Henderson, supra note 122, at 630-32. Henderson proposes a product design liability 
statute imposing specific requirements upon plaintiffs that constitute conditions for recovery. Lim-
ited defenses are available to defendants if they can meet a set of specifically described circum-
stances. These conditions imposed upon the parties compel an examination of the benefits and 
costs of alternative designs. 
13l. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra. 
132. See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra (discussing subjective nature of this weighing and 
the resulting difficulties). 
133. ,See Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 24, 484 P.2d 47, 62 (1971). 
134. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 809, 395 A.2d 843, 847 (1978). See 
Rmnved Controversy, supra note 3, at 775-76. An alternative approach would impose upon the plain-
tiff the burden of establishing that an alternative design or additional safety feature was available 
at the time the product was designed that would have prevented or reduced the plaintiff's injuries. 
The burden would then shift to the defendant manufacturer to establish that the marginal costs 
and risks of such an alternative outweighed its marginal benefits and utilities. The justifieation for 
this allocation of the burden of proof, which is similar to the approach taken by the California 
Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 
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Although such a marginal cost-benefit analysis would involve a sub-
jective weighing of many factors, it would be preferable to the risk-util-
ity test in terms of providing guidance to manufacturers regarding 
required safety features. The manfacturers would be directed to search 
out and consider all alternative product designs in order to increase the 
product's safety without significantly raising its cost to the consumer or 
substantially diminishing its utility. Henderson has criticized a similar 
proposal on the grounds that a plaintiff's case would rest on theoretical 
testimony about alternative designs that have not been tested through 
actual experience. 135 Other commentators, however, have argued that a 
design defect case based upon such theoretical testimony is no different 
than other tort cases in which causation issues are determined by expert 
testimony in response to hypothetical questions. 136 
Some courts, whether applying the consumer expectations test 137 or 
the risk-utility test,138 have held that a plaintiff, in order to establish a 
cause of action in a design defect case, must show that there was a safer, 
yet practical, alternative design. 139 Moreover, plaintiffs have been asked 
to show feasibility in terms of economy, practicality, and technology.140 
The proposed test would also require this showing. 
Courts, however, have recognized a caveat to this required proof. If 
the danger is sufficiently severe and the product has only limited utility, 
a judge or a jury could find that a reasonable manufacturer would not 
have introduced such a product into the stream of commerce. HI Many 
courts recognize that some products simply are too dangerous to be con-
sidered adequately designed. 142 The proposed standard reflects this 
(1978), is that "most of the evidentiary matters which may be relevant to the determination of the 
adequacy of a product's design under the 'risk-benefit' standard ... involve technical matters 
peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer .... " Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. 
Rptr. at 237. 
135. See Henderson, mpra note I, at 1569-71. See also O'Oonnell,Dl!.fign Litigation and the State of 
the Art: Terminology, Prtuti'ce and Rifonn, 11 AKRON L. REv. 627, 646-61 (1978); Comment, The State if 
the Art Defnue in ProdlKis LiMrlily: "Unreasonob()' lJangerous" to the Injured Consumer, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 
915 (1980). 
136. Twerski, Weinstein, Oonaher & Piehler, mIra note 3, at 532-34. 
137. See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 66, 577 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1978). 
138. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying New Jersey law); Loli v. 
Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974) (applying Illinois law). 
139. See notes 137-38 mpra. 
140. See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 70,577 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1978) (plain-
tiff must show effect of alternative design on "cost, economy of operation, maintenance require-
ments, overall performance, [and] safety''). See also Loli v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th 
Cir. 1974). 
141. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 7I n.5, 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 n.5 (1978). 
142. See, e.g., Drayton v. Jiffee Chern. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (strict liabil-
ity imposed for facial bums from liquid drain cleaner with unnecessarily high concentration of an 
unreasonably caustic chemical); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979) (most 
stringent warning would not have prevented gun from firing when buyer grabbed it as it slipped 
during unloading); Ruggeri v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 III. App. 3d 525, 380 N.E.2d 445 
(1978) (despite adequate warnings, adhesive too volatile and flammable for intended use); Sturm, 
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same caveat in the plaintiff's burden of proof. Even if a plaintiff could 
not convince the judge or the jury that an alternative design would have 
been better than the existing design, a judge or a jury should be permit-
ted to hold that the product presents such a substantial danger to the 
public that it should not be distributed and sold, even though it incorpo-
rates all feasible safety features and includes adequate warnings and 
instructions. 
As a matter of public policy, courts should hold a manufacturer liable 
for injuries caused by a product he designed and marketed where the 
product, although accompanied by adequate warnings and instructions, 
presents a significant risk of danger to consumers and bystanders when 
used in a reasonably foreseeable manner. This policy should prevail re-
gardless of the cost of adopting safer alternative designs. Such judicial 
policy would be consistent with the administrative regulatory authority 
of the Consumer Product Safety Commission to ban the manufacture, 
sale, and distribution of products that present an unacceptable risk to 
public health and safety.143 The proposed test, however, would recog-
nize, as have the courts that follow comment k of Restatement section 
402A,I44 that a manufacturer should not be liable for injuries caused by 
the design of an "unavoidably unsafe" product where the product's util-
ity outweighs its risk of harm, and the product contains adequate warn-
ings and instructions. 
Applying the risk-utility test, some courts have held that the magni-
tude of the risk of harm should be determined either at the time of 
trial 145 or at the time of sale. 146 Under the proposed test, the judge or 
the jury should determine whether a better design was feasible at the 
time the manufacturer designed the product. 147 Moreover, if a feasible, 
Ruger & Co. v. Boyd, PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) '8209 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (no warning sufficient 
where light blow to hammer caused gun to fire); Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 
1978) (no warning sufficient where slight change in design of blade on garbage truck would have 
prevented serious if not fatal injury). Se~ also Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 3, 
at 526. 
143. 15 U.S.C. § 2057 (1976). 
144. Se~, ~.g., Helene Curtis Indus. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967) (professional hair 
bleaching product not defective where appropriate instructions given), &"1. d~1Il~d, 391 U.S. 913 
(1968); Cochran v. Brooke, 243 Or. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966) (drug prescribed to patient for arthritis 
not defective); McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965) (druggists not liable where 
prescription filled in accordance with directions); W. KIMBLE & R.O. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABIL-
ITY §§ 56, 84-85 (West's Series 1979). Prescription drugs are an example of worthwhile "unavoid-
ably unsafe" products. 
145. Se~, e.g., Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1968) (evaluates present risk of 
harm of six-year-old ladder). 
146. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.]. 152, 181,386 A.2d 816, 830 (1978) 
(balances gravity of risk to workman operating machine with feasibility and expense of installing 
safety device in 1956 when machine sold). 
147. Se~ Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976); Mondshour v. General 
Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. III (D. Md. 1979). See gmera/()I O'Donnell, supra note 135; Phillips, 
supra note 3, at 115-19; Comment, supra note 135, at 915. 
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safer alternative design becomes available between the time of design 
and the time of manufacture or sale, the manufacturer should have a 
duty to adopt such a design. This duty would arise unless the cost of 
retooling machinery, casting new dies and molds, and revising already 
manufactured components and products is greater than the existing de-
sign's risk of harm to consumers and bystanders. If such a feasible alter-
native design becomes available after the product has been 
manufactured, distributed, or sold to consumers, the manufacturer 
should not have a duty to recall the product in order to replace or mod-
ify it if the costs of a recall outweigh the existing design's risk to consum-
ers and bystanders. 148 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The standards that courts presently apply to determine whether a 
product's design is defective do not provide the manufacturer with suffi-
cient guidance regarding safety requirements that must be incorporated 
into a product. In actual practice, design defect cases involve a margi-
nal risk-utility analysis comparing a product's design with alternatives 
that might have reduced or prevented plaintiff's injuries. 149 Adoption of 
a design defect standard that focuses upon alternatives to the product's 
design, coupled with a requirement that products meet minimum safety 
standards, would reflect the actual way in which most courts decide de-
sign defect cases. Concomitantly, consumers would be protected from 
dangerously designed products, and manufacturers would have more 
specific guidance regarding the safety features to be included in their 
products that are required by law. 
148. The costs of recall, modification, and replacement that a manufacturer would have to 
bear in complying with this duty would include the transaction costs of locating products that have 
left his control and possession. Such costs may be high, and the feasibility oflocating products low, 
if retailers have sold the products to members of the public. This would be true particularly in the 
case oflow-priced products for which the retailer does not keep records of individual transactions or 
for which the manufacturer does not use owner or warranty registration cards. Even if products 
that have been sold to consumers can be located, the manufacturer will incur administrative ex-
penses in contacting the product's present owners and arranging for its return to him or a service 
outlet for modification or replacement. 
149. Suo ~.g., Henderson, supra note I, at 1567-68; Renewed ControlJl!TSY, supra note 3, at 774-76. 
